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In this paper, ‘novelty’ is explored through a recent historical episode from high energy experimental
physics to offer an understanding of novelty as disruption. I call this the ‘750 GeV episode’, an episode
where two Large Hadron Collider (LHC) experiments, CMS and ATLAS, each independently observed
indications of a new resonance at approximately 750 GeV. With further data collection, the initial excess
was determined to be a statistical fluctuation. The approach taken, in the analysis of interviews con-
ducted with physicists who were involved in the ‘750 GeV episode’, is to consider novelty as a valued
difference. Following this conceptually driven approach, disambiguate between several notions of nov-
elty through the identification of varied differences. This disambiguation is achieved through exploring
differences expressed in comparison to varied expressions of the standard model, and through exploring
varied ‘types’ of difference (properties and entities) to introduce disruptive exploratory experimentation,
a complementary understanding ‘exploratory experimentation’ (Elliott, 2007; Steinle, 1997, 2002). I show
that the kinds of novelty framed as most valuable are those that violate expectations and are difficult to
incorporate into the existing structures of knowledge. In such instances, disruption to the existing
ontology or ways of knowing is valued. This positive appraisal of disruption, and contradiction over
confirmation, is considered in the recent context of high-energy physics, where several physicists have
claimed that there is a lack of promising directions for the future, or even that the field is in a ‘crisis’. I
show that the role of disruption explains the differences between the differing notions of novelty.
Furthermore, I show that the positive appraisal of disruption is based on forward looking assessments of
future fertility, or heuristic appraisal (Nickles, 1989, 2006). Within the context of concerns of a lack of
available promising future directions, disruption becomes a generator of alternative futures.
© 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd.1 See for example: (Buckley, 2016; Redi, 2016).“The state of being recent, unfamiliar, or different from the past
is actually a little difficult to talk about in itself, since modern
English is peculiarly deficient in respectable terms for the new
… The linguistic awkwardness in finding a good descriptive
term for the new is almost certainly the effect of a deeper dif-
ficulty in coming up with a definition of it.” (North, 2013)2 The Higgs result is an area that has received recent attention in the HPS liter-
ature. A special issue, of Synthese (2017), recently brought together contributions
written by physicists and philosophers.
3 Historically, the prediction of the Higgs predates the prediction of the top
quark. However, evidence for the Higgs was found following the discovery of the
top quark at Fermilab in 1995. For further details see (Staley, 2004).
4 Confirmation of the existence of the Higgs is widely considered to have
completed the standard model, however, the discovery process is an extended one
and whilst the measurement of the mass and subsequent measurement of the spin
of the boson and the various couplings, indicate that it is very likely to be the Higgs1. Introduction
In this paper, I will explore ‘novelty’ through a recent historical
episode of LHC physics. I call this the ‘750 GeV episode’, an episode
where two LHC experiments, CMS and ATLAS, each independently
observed indications of a new resonance in the same mass region.
Several physicists indicated, both at the time and then ing novelty at the LHC: Heuri
rg/10.1016/j.shpsb.2019.08.00reflections, that if the significance of the result increased withmore
data, to the point where a discovery claim could be made, then this
would be more novel1 than the Nobel Prize winning discovery of
the Higgs Boson.2 This is quite extraordinary given the significance
of the experimental discovery of the Higgs, which was last
confirmed prediction3 of the standard model of particle physics4predicted by the SM, more measurements are required to see if the Higgs does play
the role in the standard model that is predicted.
stic appraisal of disruptive experimentation, Studies in History and
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dicted). Whilst the observed resonance ultimately turned out to be
a statistical fluctuation, these expressions of greater novelty moti-
vated a deeper investigation of the episode as a case study,
including interviews with those who conducted the search and
analysis in CMS and ATLAS to probe their reflections on the 750 GeV
episode and novelty.
The Large Hadron Collider at CERN is one of the largest andmost
complex experiments ever built, consisting of a 27 km ring inwhich
protons are accelerated and made to collide in bunches of proton
collisions in four detectors. Each of these detectors was indepen-
dently built and is run a by large experimental collaboration: the
ALICE, ATLAS, CMS, and LHCb experiments. ATLAS and CMS are
multi-purpose detectors, designed to understand the origin of
electroweak symmetry breaking, to search for physics beyond the
standard model, and to perform precision measurements of pro-
cesses within and beyond the standard model (ATLAS
Collaboration, 2003; CMS Collaboration, 2002). These epistemic
goals make the ATLAS and CMS experiments the ideal place to
explore novelty in the context of the practices of scientific experi-
mentation. Not only do these epistemic goals suggest that the LHC
experiments are aimed at being novelty-producing machines, but
in their diversity they also hint at diverse understandings of
‘newness’. This presents an opportunity to examine situated ex-
pressions of novelty: a concept often used but rarely interrogated.
ATLAS and CMS completed the first period of data taking at
13 TeV in October 2015. Researchers in ATLAS and CMS each inde-
pendently performed a high mass search in the diphoton channel.
Both signature searches, i.e. a search for a diphoton signature, saw a
small excess at approximately 750 GeV in their results in November
2015. Each of these results independently indicated that there
might be an as yet undiscovered particle with a mass of 750 GeV.5
Both results were made public when they were included in the
‘Jamboree’ session at CERN on December 15 (Kado, 2015; Olsen,
2015). However, news of the results leaked out of the collabora-
tions and some theorists wrote papers that were uploaded to the
arXiv within hours of the official announcements by ATLAS and
CMS.6 In each of the announcements from ATLAS and CMS
spokespersons the low local and global significance of the results
was emphasised, and a number of experimentalists indicated that
this result could be a statistical fluctuation that would disappear
with more data.7 In weeks that followed hundreds of theory papers
were uploaded to the arXiv with diverse potential theoretical ex-
planations for the excess, and over 500 papers were published by
the end of the episode.
Both of the analysis groups within ATLAS and CMS immediately
attempted to check the results but LHC had just entered into a short
shut down and no new data could be produced. ATLAS looked at the
8 TeV data to see if an excess could be observed. CMS determined a
way to use some 13 TeV data that had been collected whilst the
magnet was not working, the so-called ‘0 T data’. Both presented at
the Moriond conference in March 2016, where CMS presented a
result with a slightly higher local and global significance due to the
inclusion of the 0 T data (Delmastro, 2016; Musella, 2016). Data
collection began again in March 2016. When the analysis was
completed over May and June no excess was observed. The results
were presented publicly at the ICHEP conference in August 2016
(Lenzi, 2016; Rovelli, 2016). Further analysis determined that the5 This is an oversimplification: the excess observed could also have been from
multiple particles.
6 See for example: (Franceschini et al., 2015).
7 See for example: Dave Charlton's comments in (Sample, 2016).
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was responsible for the result.
In order to explore more deeply novelty in the context of the
case study, I conducted semi-structured oral history interviews
with experimentalists who worked on the 750 GeV analysis in CMS
and ATLAS, at different levels (PhD candidate to coordinators). In
this paper, I locate and explore different expressions of novelty
found in interviews with experimental physicists. In order to do
this, I will consider novelty as a relational concept, i.e. I locate
novelty in the interviews where two or more things are described
as connected, in some way differentiated, and where the difference
is positively valued. This conceptually driven analysis allows for the
exploration of the diversity of novelty systematically, where the
same criteria for the identification of novelty are applied across all
interviewmaterials. Instead of attempting an exhaustive taxonomy
of novelty, some of the differences between understandings of
novelty, that are significant within the context of the case study,
will be explored. I will outline and explore some differing expres-
sions of ontological novelty found in relation to different expres-
sions of the standard model (differing ontologies). Also located are
different kinds of novel contributions to the high-energy physics
ontology: properties vs entities identified through differing ex-
pressions of epistemic practices. Across each of these differing ex-
pressions of novelty are differing positive appraisals in that there
are different attributions of value.
The kinds of novelty framed as most valuable are those that
violate expectations and are difficult to incorporate into the exist-
ing structures of knowledge. In such instances, disruption to the
existing ontology or ways of knowing were valued. This positive
appraisal of disruption, and contradiction over confirmation, is
explored in the recent context of high-energy physics, where
several physicists have claimed that there is a lack of promising
directions for the future. I show that the role of disruption explains
the differences between the differing notions of novelty. Further-
more, I show that the positive appraisal of disruption is based on
forward looking assessments of future fertility, or heuristic
appraisal. Within the context of concerns of a lack of available
promising future directions, disruption becomes a generator of
alternative futures.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section two theories of novelty
from history and philosophy of science are analysed. In section
three I outline my approach to novelty, both conceptually and in
terms of a systematic methodology for the identification of novelty
in the interviews. In section four, I identify different notions of
novelty present in the interview material. In section five, I explain
some of the differences between the notions of novelty can be
attributed to the role of expectations and disruption. I also show
how the positive appraisals of disruption are heuristic appraisals
that are future focused and based on assessments of the future
fertility of generating alternative futures for the high-energy
physics research program. Finally, I reflect on the context in
which these assessments were made and the uniqueness of valuing
disruption over confirmation.
2. Theories of novelty in the history and philosophy of
science literature
‘Novelty’ as a concept has received surprisingly little attention in
scholarship (considered broadly), as well as in history and philos-
ophy of science (HPS). North, in his book length treatment, written
from the perspective of cultural studies, points to the historic lack
of philosophical engagement: “it doesn't take much looking to
discover that there isn't any such tradition, no standard text, no
omnibus history” (North, 2013). Whilst North does not resolve any
difficulties in clarifying the concept of novelty, through discussionstic appraisal of disruptive experimentation, Studies in History and
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novelty he makes clear the inherent ambiguity of the concept. In
this section, I will explore treatments of novelty from different
traditions in HPS in order to develop an approach to novelty that
offers a middle ground by drawing upon the insights from each of
these bodies of literature.
Conceptual engagement with novelty in HPS literature comes
from two significant areas: debates over scientific realism and the
no miracles argument (NMA), and debates over emergence. Con-
ceptual clarity of novelty was sought following the challenge issued
by Laudan (1981) to the NMA. Those seeking to defend a version of
scientific realism argued for a more precise definition of successful
science that did not include the counter examples identified by
Laudan. A variety of authors argued that the relevant class of suc-
cessful scientific theories are those theories that make novel pre-
dictions, which are confirmed by experiment.8 For this approach to
work, a precise understanding of novelty was required. Two broad
options were debated: ‘temporal novelty’ and ‘use novelty’ (i.e.
novel predictions from a theory that are confirmed later in time),
and predictions that do not use the empirical content in the theo-
retical construction of a prediction (Ladyman, 1999; Leplin, 1997;
Musgrave, 1988, pp. 229e252; Psillos, 1999; Worrall, 1985). There
were a variety of positions offered on ‘use novelty’, such as from
Leplin (1997) who argued that for a prediction to be novel it had to
be both independent and unique. That is to say, for Leplin, the
empirical content predicted by the theory if it is already known
must not be necessary for the theory, that the theory must explain
and predict the empirical content, and that no other theory pro-
vides a reason to expect the empirical content.9 In all cases of use
and temporal novel predictions, the argument is that only the truth
of the theory generating the novel prediction can explain the suc-
cessful novel prediction. Herein lies the difficulty with the debates
over novelty in this literature for the purposes of this paper: the
focus is exclusively on the theoretical generation of novelty.
Furthermore, the authors are not interested in how scientists use
and draw upon the concept on novelty implicitly or explicitly; the
perspective of the experimentalist, and even the theorist, is
missing.
The second area that also requires investigation into the concept
of novelty is the literature on emergence. In this literature, authors
consider when an assemblage of known objects is, or should be,
considered novel. In order to debate issues such as reductionism, a
definition of novelty is required to establish the class of phenomena
categorised as emergent. For example, Jeremy Butterfield estab-
lished, informally and formally, definitions of novelty in order to
discuss examples of emergence that he argues are compatible with
reductionism (Butterfield, 2011a; 2011b). The informal definition is
as follows: “‘novel’ means something like: ‘not definable from the
comparison class’, and maybe ‘showing features (maybe striking
ones) absent from the comparison class’.” The informal definition is
relational in approach in that it relies on comparisons, but for
Butterfield novelty occurs where a comparison cannot successfully
be made. For the purposes of this paper this literature is also un-
helpful in that the definitions are theory-focused. However, like the
literature on novelty and scientific realism, these debates show
how different understandings of novelty can be established for the
purposes of different positions.8 The notion that predictions which are in some sense ‘novel’ or ‘new’ have
epistemic value can also be found in many other earlier works, such as Whewell's
work on confirmation where he argues that a hypothesis “ought” to entail pre-
dictions which precede observation (Whewell, 1885, p. 88). See Musgrave for dis-
cussions of predictivism in Descartes, Leibniz and others (Musgrave, 1974).
9 This position was criticized by Ladyman (1999). See Psillos (2009) for an
overview of some of the details of the various positions offered in these debates.
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been written from within a tradition that attempts to formulate
general historical and philosophical accounts of science (for
example Kuhn and Lakatos). Both Kuhn and Lakatos are well known
for their discussions of novelty: Kuhn developed the concept of the
anomaly and Lakatos pinned progressive research programmes
with the requirement that they make novel predictions that
become novel facts. It is perhaps unsurprising, given Lakatos'
tradition of revisionist histories of science, to discover that he too
did not delve deeply into the use of the concept of novelty by his
historic actors. Instead, he defined a novel prediction as being
derived from instances where theoretical content is greater than
empirical content (i.e. the theoretical content that does not have an
empirical basis is understood as a novel prediction). In his account,
a novel fact is a novel prediction which is later empirically
confirmed (temporal novelty) (Lakatos, Worrall, & Currie, 1978, p.
184).
Kuhn's ‘Structure’ (Kuhn, 1970) has been interpreted and rein-
terpreted many times in the service of divergent positions on rev-
olution and change in rationalist and relativist accounts of scientific
progress. He himself famously revised (or extended, depending on
interpretation) his own position in later works (Kuhn, 1977, pp.
74e86). In ‘Structure’ anomalies are a part of normal science and
are paradigm-dependent i.e. an anomaly is a result that contradicts
the paradigm, or cannot immediately be reconciled within the
paradigm. Anomalies are never explicitly sought (p. 52e53, 64,169)
and, where found, are at least initially considered to be the fault of
the scientist (p. 35), rather than the paradigm. If an anomaly
continued to resist reconciliation with the paradigm, Kuhn claimed
that historically this has resulted in a period of crisis (p.75), which
was sometimes followed by a revolution. One of the well-known
and well-documented difficulties with Kuhn's history of science is
that he did not engage with experiment: as Hacking has noted,
“immense experimental or instrumental novelty is simply missing
in Kuhn's theoretical stance” (Hacking, 2012, p. xvii). For the pur-
poses of this paper, from Kuhnwe can take a notion of novelty that
is in relation to the current knowledge (rather than adopting the
notion of paradigms) and can consider how this might be expanded
to include experiment. However, a notion of novelty that occurs
inevitably as a standard element of science does not allow for an
exploration into how scientists aim for novelty, may positively
appraise novelty, or make novelty possible.
Detailed historical approaches have not significantly engaged
with the concept of novelty; indeed, the concept has often been
rejected as uninteresting. This is in part due the association be-
tween novel results and discovery and the long-standing tradition
to be sceptical of the concept of ‘discovery’ following the wide-
spread adoption of the attributional model of discovery (Brannigan,
1981). This is also in part due to the influence of laboratory studies,
which took an ethnographic approach to examine in detail scien-
tists, and their research practices, in situ. Novelty, in this approach,
is determined to be an uninteresting final product and examination
of novelty was not in keeping with the aim of laboratory studies to
examine science in process in very fine detail10. Latour andWoolgar
argued that they “found it extremely difficult to formulate de-
scriptions of scientific activity which do not yield to the misleading
impression that science is about discovery (rather than creativity
and construction). It is not just that a change in emphasis is
required, rather, the formulations which characterise historical
descriptions of scientific practice require exorcism before the na-
ture of this practice can be best understood” (emphasis authors'10 Merz (2018) recently made a similar point in a review of science studies liter-
ature on the closely related concept of innovation.
stic appraisal of disruptive experimentation, Studies in History and
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tivist tradition maintains this denial of the value of examining and
explaining novelty. Pickering (1995) associated novelty explicitly
with his notion of “resistance” (p. 119) as part of his argument for
science proceeding through a “dialectic of resistance and accom-
modation” (p. xi). Pickering further argues that emergence is “brute
chance” and criticises searches for mechanistic explanations of
emergence (p. 24).
In this paper, I pursue an integrated approach, offering a middle
ground between detailed studies that do not prioritise novelty and
formal or generalist perspectives that do not prioritise the
perspective of scientists or experiments. Rather than attempting to
explain novelty, as is the aim in the literature concerning emer-
gence, or attempting to define novelty via necessary and sufficient
conditions, I follow the various uses of novelty by experimentalists
in order to gain insight into how and where the concept of novelty
is invoked by experimentalists. This approach allows for conceptual
engagement with novelty, whilst also building upon the insights of
researchers working from detailed historical accounts who exam-
ined the local and contextual nature of epistemic practices (in this
paper, understandings of novelty come from the actors rather than
from considerations of novelty as discovery or as a final product).
This also draws on the insights from the philosophical literature
where the importance and also inherent ambiguity of the concept
of novelty was highlighted. In examining how novelty is framed, in
the appraisals of experimentalists, this paper does not suggest that
novelties merely exist in discourses of appraisal and does not argue
against the relevance of novelty for understanding emergence,
scientific realism, or scientific progress. Rather, the integrated
approach of this paper allows for both the identification of diverse
notions of novelty from the perspective of the experimentalists
involved in the episode in question, as well as a conceptual analysis
of novelty from the historic context in which the concepts of nov-
elty are expressed.
3. Locating novelty in the interviews
I conducted interviews in 2017 with experimental physicists
from ATLAS and CMS, chosen for their experience, each having
worked in some capacity on the experimental identification or
analysis of the 750 GeV resonance. The interviews were conducted
as semi-structured oral history interviews, taking into consider-
ation the historic context of the 750 GeV episode and the context in
which the interviews were conducted. At the time of the in-
terviews, the excess had been found to be a statistical fluctuation
and no other evidence for physics beyond the standard model had
been found at the LHC. Slight modifications were made to the
questions asked based on who was being interviewed and their
experience, and designed to investigate the interview participant's
experiences relevant to the episode. Questions were asked on: the
interview subject's background and experiences within ATLAS or
CMS; the development of the 750 GeV episode and the interview
subject's involvement; the interview subject's perspectives and
reflections on the 750 GeV episode; and the interview subject's
perspectives and reflections on novelty. All participants have been
anonymised in this text and assigned unrelated surname pseudo-
nyms. The length of the interviews was between one and three
hours.
As the aim of this paper is to explore how novelty is framed by
experimentalist interview participants who were involved in the
750 GeV episode, an initial requirement was to formulate criteria to
identify consistently across the interviews where the interview
participants drew upon novelty either explicitly or non-explicitly.
As was outlined in the discussion of the debates over novelty in
the philosophical literature, it is difficult to establish when aPlease cite this article as: Ritson, S., Probing novelty at the LHC: Heuri
Philosophy of Modern Physics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2019.08.00difference is sufficiently different to be considered novel. There is
the problem that if defined too broadly, as the quality of being
‘new’, almost anything the participants described as being different
in some small way could have been construed as novel, rendering
the exploration of the content somewhat vacuous. One option was
to follow the use of our actor's category: new physics, a category
often employed. However, to restrict ourselves to the actor's cate-
gory results in the loss of some conceptual clarity and the omission
of novelty that does not refer only to results, which therefore ex-
cludes processes.
The approach adopted was to consider novelty as a valued dif-
ference. This working understanding was applied in a close analysis
of the interviews, using the understanding of the concept as an
analytic lens through which to identify the perspectives of the
experimentalists interviewed, and locate novelty in various re-
lations, or expressed differences, which are in various ways valued.
This approach avoids using a definition that is too broad, as not all
differences are considered, but also allows for the identification of
diverse framings of novelty in the interviews. This approach has the
further advantage of foregrounding the role of appraisal in how
novelty is framed through the exploration of the attribution of
value. I certainly do not claim to have defined novelty, or to have
identified necessary and sufficient conditions for the condition of
novelty, or claim that there are no other promising conceptual
approaches. Instead, the claim is that this approach to the analysis
is productive in that it allows for restricted diversity in the iden-
tification of notions of novelty, and for the exploration of the role of
appraisal within the interviews from the case study.
Following this approach, I identified reference to novelty in the
interviews only where both aspects could be located: difference
and value. When locating differences, ‘difference’ was approached
conceptually as necessarily comparative, in that in order for
something to be described as different it has to be with respect to
some reference. Value, or attribution of positive appraisal, was
located in various ways, sometimes from interview questions, in
that I explicitly asked participants for an assessment. These notions
of novelty are then analysed as being formed in reconstructions of a
historical episode; reconstructions informed by the local context
from which the interviews took place. As I show below in more
detail, and through the exploration and analysis of examples,
different understandings of novelty come from diversity in what
and how something is different (diverse relations in the in-
terviews), and what and how something is valued (diverse as-
sessments in the interviews). The choice of the examples for this
paper was motivated by illustrating this diversity and to disam-
biguate the notions of novelty in this historical episode.
The different ‘notions’ of novelty analysed in the interviews are
organised in this paper into two groups of reference classes, where
the reference class determines a comparison from which a differ-
ence can claimed. Each of these classes is an assemblage of the
current state of knowledge. The paper is organised to proceed
stepwise through an exploration of examples from each of the
identified reference classes. This approach highlights some of the
differences between the overlapping reference classes and allows
for the exploration of the different reasoning behind appraisals of
value. By proceeding stepwise through the reference classes of
relations to the current knowledge, the role of disruption to the
current knowledge in the reasoning behind positive appraisal is
foregrounded. Not only is the role of disruption established, as one
that differentiates, but in keeping with exploring novelty as a
valued difference, the role of disruption in positive appraisals of
difference is explored. Perhaps surprisingly, disruption is shown to
be a positive measure of novelty.stic appraisal of disruptive experimentation, Studies in History and
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4.1. First group of reference classes: the verified SM, the predicted
SM, and BSM approaches
Many of the relations in which novelty was identified in the
interviews were in claims11 concerning relations to the ontology of
particle physics, which in particle physics today means the stan-
dard model (SM). The SM is an assemblage of theoretical and
experimental insights describing particles and their interactions
that was developed by experimental and theoretical physicists
beginning in the 1970s. The contemporary SM includes three
fundamental forces (or interactions), the strong, weak and elec-
tromagnetic forces and is comprised of two gauge theories; namely,
the electroweak theory which unifies and describes the weak and
electromagnetic interactions, and the theory of quantum chromo-
dynamics (QCD) that describes strong interactions. The SM has
been extraordinarily successful in that it has been confirmed by
thousands of experiments, to very high degree of precision. Despite
this, the SM remains incomplete, in that it cannot account for the
fourth fundamental force: gravity (as well as dark matter, dark
energy, neutrino masses, and matter-antimatter asymmetry), and
has a number of perceived conceptual problems.12
There are several different classes of expressions of the SM in
which relations were located in the interviews, each of which forms
a different comparison point, which I organise here into three
reference classes. These include comparisons made with respect to
the experimentally verified results, results predicted by SM, and
results predicted by the many extensions of the SM. Here experi-
mentally verified results include the collection of currently
accepted experimental results that have been incorporated into the
SM framework. From these three reference classes I identify three
notions of novel results. The first notion is identified by those re-
sults that are expressed as having a difference in observation status
from the experimentally verified SM, such as the self-coupling of
the Higgs that has been predicted by the SM but not observed. The
second and third notions are those that are identified as having a
difference in observational status from the experimentally verified
SM as well as a difference in theoretical status in that they are not
described theoretically by the SM. The third notion of novel results
are those that also differ with respect to what is described by the
so-called beyond the standard model (BSM) approaches, such as
the minimal supersymmetric standard model (MSSM) which
attempt to extend the SM. This reference class differs from the first
two in that there are a very large number of BSM models,
conventionally separated into supersymmetry (SUSY) models, and11 Note that by using the terminology of claim here, I do not wish to contribute to
the debates concerning the semantic component of scientific realism. I take an
agnostic stance with respect to whether the interview subjects interpret their
claims literally or take a more instrumentalist stance. This is because the argument
of this paper is orthogonal to the realism debates and instead focuses on heuristic
appraisal of future fertility, where such appraisals are compatible with either a
realist or instrumentalist stance.
12 This is a very simplified view of the standard model, intended here just to give a
broad introduction. Some of the conceptual problems with the standard model
include the hierarchy problem and the perception that the standard model contains
‘too many’ free parameters. However, there is yet no consensus as to nature of these
problems, or the weight that can or should be attributed to them.
13 SUSY models invoke a symmetry that transforms bosons into fermions and vice
versa, implying that every SM particle must have a superpartner with spin differing
by ½. In many of these models, the lightest SUSY particle is predicted to be stable
and at located at a mass scale that is detectable by ATLAS and CMS. The term
‘exotica’ is used by ATLAS and CMS to identify non-SUSY BSM models, a diverse
group including, for example, models with extra dimensions, dark matter models,
and extended Higgs models. For a prospects analysis for both ATLAS and CMS prior
to run 2 see (Cakir, ATLAS, & CMS, 2015).
Please cite this article as: Ritson, S., Probing novelty at the LHC: Heuri
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The accumulative potential of each of these reference classes is
clear, in that a result that is considered different with respect to
BSM models could also be different with respect to the predicted
SM and the verified SM. Each of these classes of reference is similar
in that each is considered with respect to the current state of
knowledge; though the classes differ in degree of acceptance.14
Whilst the differences between the reference classes may seem to
be just steps further away from the existing knowledge, interesting
differences become apparent through the exploration of the
differing ways in which examples from each notion of novelty are
positively appraised.
In order to explore the first group of reference classes against
which novelty is claimed, I will draw upon a quote from an inter-
view participant from the CMS experiment, Carraway, who
described the first observation of 750 GeV excess in December 2015
relation to the now historic discovery of the Higgs:
“There was a lot of anticipation, people were really watching
ATLAS and CMS to show something, and then by chance
something came out. It didn't happen since … there is nothing
to compare. Of course there was the Higgs discovery, but it was
very different, because everybody knew that things have to go
that way, maybe that year or the following year. But we were
pretty sure that the Higgs was there, so the discovery was a
confirmation. Here, things could have been more exciting.”
Here we have two relations: a relation expressed of the differ-
ences between the historic development of the Higgs and the
750 GeV excess and a relation between the undiscovered Higgs to
the discovered Higgs. We can also see that the historic novelty of
the Higgs is described through the relation to the experimentally
verified SM, the process of discovery is framed as searching for
something that was expected but at the time not yet experimen-
tally verified. This is an example of the first reference class in that
the difference between the discovered Higgs to the undiscovered
Higgs is experimental verification. In contrast the 750 GeV excess
was “very different” in that there were no expectations generated
by the SM. The importance of expectations in the relations inwhich
I interpret appeal to novelty, non-explicitly in this case, is quite
apparent here in that the relation to the reference class can be one
of different and expected, as the Higgs is described here, or
different and not expected, as the 750 GeV excess is described. The
interpretation of the attribution of value is quite straightforward:
both results are described as exciting, albeit the 750 GeV as “more
exciting”.
To tease out the differences between the second and third
reference classes I will explore an example where the interview
participant, Wilson, was asked to simply describe the 750 GeV
episode. The example below is also helpful in interpreting the value
placed on the 750 GeV excess:
“The interesting thing, let's say, there were many interesting
things at the time. But, one thing that I can highlight… of course
it was unexpected, as anything is as opposed to the Higgs,
although it was, let's say, partly unexpected it was something
that was not predicted … in this case we really had zero ex-
pectations, wewere just searching and something popped up…14 The model based extensions of the SM are constrained by experimental and
theoretical results and whilst degree of belief in various models differs across re-
searchers, models such as MSSM have a long history of belief and searches for
experimental evidence for these models was cited as part of the physics argument
for the construction of the Large Hadron Collider.
stic appraisal of disruptive experimentation, Studies in History and
2
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significant role in the claim of a new entity, complicating the distinction between
properties and entities. If you consider the historical development of the Higgs
boson, in 2012 ATLAS and CMS both announced that they had seen evidence for a
boson with a measured mass of approximately 125 GeV. The measurement of the
particle and the measurement of the spin both played a significant role in the
process of discovery as the SM did not predict the mass of a SM Higgs boson but did
predict the spin. Now that the mass has been measured, more measurements are
required to see if the Higgs does play the role in the SM that is predicted i.e.
confirming it as a SM Higgs boson, or indicating that the entity may not be a SM
Higgs boson. In this example, measurements are constitutive of new entity claims
in various and often experimentally complex ways.
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possible model of new physics that you can imagine, but it was
for sure not the most conventional signature that one could
imagine.”
Wilson separates out different senses in which novel results can
be unexpected. The 750 GeV excess was unexpected in that there
were no existing predictions from the SM (the first reference class).
Furthermore, once the excess had been observed it was not easily
reconciled with the existing extensions of the SM (the third refer-
ence class). It is important to note that in the framing of Wilson,
part of the novelty of the result comes from the process by which it
was established that the signature could not be easily accommo-
dated, or made “conventional”.
Wilson continued, claiming:
“… in general, if we have the means to look for something, and
we I think we should look and not be afraid I mean, it's in a way,
is what we call a signature-based search, not model-oriented
search. So sometimes we really go after models … and we
tailor searches to test thosemodels. And sometimes we just look
at things which can be plausible …”
The diphoton signature searches that observed the 750 GeV
excess in CMS and ATLAS were both broadly motivated by BSM
models, so called Randall Sundrum (RS) extradimensional models
which predict spin 2 resonances (CMS, 2015) and Higgs like spin
0 resonances with masses greater than 200 GeV (ATLAS, 2015), and
each of these classes of models predict a resonance that will decay
to produce a diphoton signature. Despite the broad BSM motiva-
tion, the analysis strategy of both ATLAS and CMS was to search for
an unspecified local excess in the mgg spectrum (ATLAS, 2015; CMS,
2015). Here we can further disambiguate between predicted nov-
elty and unpredicted novelty through the expectations identified of
different experimental processes. Model based searches can
generate a class of precisely expected results, a result expected
through a prediction of BSM model. In contrast, a signature search
could generate a result that is more generically expected in that it
might fit into the framework of classes of BSM models, or a result
that is possible but may not be described by an existing BSMmodel.
Here we see that some of the attribution of novelty of the 750 GeV
resonance was derived from both the experimental process and the
determination that the result was inconsistent with precise BSM
model predictions.
Each of the notions of novelty identified here is closely related
but by identifying the three different possible expressions of the SM
that serve as comparisons, it is possible to see the reasoning behind
how the 750 GeV excess was described as potentially more novel
than the Higgs. Each reference class, in the presented order, iden-
tifies a notion of novelty that is a step further away from what is
expected from the current experimental and theoretical knowl-
edge. A result that is compared to and different to the verified SM,
but is predicted (i.e. the historic Higgs result), is less novel than a
result that is compared to and different from both the verified and
predicted SM. A result that is compared to and different to the
verified SM and the predicted SM, but is predicted by amodel based
extension of the SM (i.e. a SUSY particle), is less novel than a result
that is different from both the verified and predicted SM, as well as
the model based extensions of the SM (i.e. the 750 GeV excess). I
will say something more about differing values across these
different relations in section five, however for now I will explore
one further complication in locating novelty in relations to the SM
(in addition to the different expressions of the SM).Please cite this article as: Ritson, S., Probing novelty at the LHC: Heuri
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Here I introduce two additional notions of novelty, which I
locate from comparisons between each notion: properties and
entities, that is, a distinction between novel knowledge of an entity
and novel knowledge of the nature of an entity. The distinction
between novel entities and novel properties on the surface also
seems to be somewhat trivial.15 However, much of the work that
has gone into large collider experiments has focused on experi-
ments that claimed to have found new entities such as quarks
(Pickering, 1984) or new interactions such as the neutral current
(Galison, 1987). Moreover, whilst measurements of properties
feature in these texts, they are not the focus.16 This section of the
paper will explore some interesting features of how properties are
framed by the interview participants, especially in the context of
the upcoming phases of the LHC. Emphasised by many of the
interview participants was, at the time of the interviews, that
ATLAS and CMS were both increasingly focusing on precision
measurements (the so-called “data-driven era” of ATLAS and CMS).
Following an examination of valued differences as examples of
novelty, I will explore an example of how measurements of the
properties of entities are construed as novel (often as opposed to
novel entities). Note that the relation in which the difference is
locatedmay bewith respect to any of the aforementioned reference
classes of novelty: i.e. a property may be different with respect to
the verified SM, the predicted SM, ormodel-based extensions of the
SM.
Baker articulated and offered an explanation of what I identify
as novel properties when he outlined what he considered to be
possible and desirable future outcomes for the upcoming phases of
the LHC: “so, in terms of new physics … I mean realistically what
we can hope to come out of the LHC now are deviations in the… I
mean are strange things essentially in the particles that we know”
(participant's emphasis). The novelty, or the expressed valued dif-
ference, can be seen through the expression of the relation of what
is part of the ontology of particle physics (the existence of certain
particles or entities) against what is not yet part of the ontology of
particle physics (i.e. the properties that have yet to be measured).
The value, in this instance, is not only found in the completion of a
measurement: it is also in a class of results that is unexpected, or
‘strange’, i.e. it is hoped that expectations will be violated.
The comparisons between novel properties and entities were
identifiable in the interviews often due to distinctions drawn in
terms of processes. For example, according to Buchanan who
described changes following the discovery of the ‘Higg-like boson’:
“… essentially we've switched from themode of trying to find [a
Higgs-like boson] to studying the thing that we got and that's a
little bit of different mind-set in some ways … So, you change
essentially from looking for something that's a bump to … un-
derstanding all sorts of details in the measurements … andThe exceptions being (Beauchemin, 2017; Staley, 2017), and a short section in
(Knorr-Cetina, 1999, pp. 52e56, 65).
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tomake a precise measurement than if you just ask the question
‘is there some bump’.”
Here the difference is framed in terms of time, and the evolution
of knowledge, in that Buchanan gives a historical perspective on the
shift from how claims are made of a novel entity to how claims are
made of the properties of the same novel entity. Buchanan draws
upon a concept of different modes of research, and this modal
framing highlights both a difference in epistemic processes and
differences in the ways of thinking. The reference classes invoked
here are framed by difference in epistemic practices rather than an
explicit difference in ontological status.
Baker also framed the measurement of properties in time,
however instead of only looking backwards for a historical
perspective, Baker also framed novel properties with an outlook to
the future. And it is here that I can further explore the apparently
conflicting simultaneous expectations from earlier: that is, the case
of an articulated expectation, which is closely linked with hope, for
results that will contradict expectations that are motivated by
theory:
“… to start with the Higgs Boson, so, I mean, that's the, the
particle we discovered last and it's the one on which we have
larger error bars, okay? So, between those error bars and the
predictions from the standard model theory there may be ef-
fects that… that would, would give us a direction e that would
be evidence essentially of something else … so … yes, there I
think is… [reason to hope or expect] I mean, obviously, because
… I mean, I keep working on this …”
There are several things of note from this extended quote, the
first being that the participant draws upon recent results to project
into the future. The large error bars on recent results are presented
as providing a space for future novelties (with respect to the SM).
Furthermore, the value expressed here is that these future results
will provide a “direction”, i.e. they will guide future research. This
assessment of value is also apparent in how Baker frames his own
work: he has invested his time, and made choices about the
research he has conducted and will conduct, due to what he pre-
sents as future fertility. This appraisal that potentially theoretically
unexpected results can provide future fertility helps us to begin to
understand how results that contradict expectations can be valued.
The focus on the potential of processes to generate fertile results
also invites consideration of novelty beyond ontological novelty,
into novel ways of knowing. Relations between processes and
practices invoked in the interviews also revealed a notion of nov-
elty in terms of ways of knowing. The relations in which I locate
novelty here are in comparisons against processes that were at
some point in time, or in some configuration of the laboratory,17 not
possible to complete or remained uncompleted. This further es-
tablishes the diversity of novelty and helps to foreground how not
only it is the case that results are valued, but it is also the case that17 Here I consider the laboratory quite broadly. One could consider the removal of
financial, or organisational, pressures as one way to frame how it came about that a
different and valued process of producing knowledge came to occur. An example
from a different area of physics, which also relies on large collaborative efforts, also
highlights this: the Nobel Prize in Physics in 2017 was given to some of the leaders
of the LIGO collaboration. The Nobel Prize committee framed the prize as being for
both the result (ontological novelty) and the organisational work required for the
LIGO detector: “for decisive contributions to the LIGO detector and the observation
of gravitational waves” (Nobel Prize Committee quoted in (“Press Release: The
Nobel Prize in Physics 2017,”).
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fertility and the utility of disruption
5.1. Disruption
In this section, the role of disruption in the various notions of
novelty in the interviews will be explored in order to obtain a
deeper understanding of differences between these notions of
novelty and the role of expectations. This will be done on the basis
that something that disrupts is described as something that alters
or destroys structures or content of belief, and a disruption is a
process described as resulting in a disturbance or problem.
Disruption is a term often used pejoratively and is often associated
with negative outcomes; consider the ‘disruptive child’ or the dread
of seeing an email indicating that your flight schedule has been
disrupted. However, in the interviews of the 750 GeV episode,
participants frequently framed disruption positively. The potential
result, a resonance at 750 GeV in the diphoton channel, was
described as something that would have been significantly
disruptive, and this potentiality was especially valued. One aspect
of how the 750 GeV result is framed as disruptive is that it was
contrary to all expectations.
van Lente has argued that expectations do not only function as
statements that are evaluated as having true or false content at
some point in the future. Expectations, where articulated, are also
“performative” in that they have an immediate impact, for example
by creating obligations (van Lente, 2012). These insights are
important in this case study, where disruption is formed by the
violation of expectations, generating an obligation to change the
framework that generated the expectations. One interview partic-
ipant, Gatz, outlined the results they now hope for, following the
end of the 750 GeV episode:
“We are all for, again, a huge strange thing. Actually, honesty, my
hope is that still e and I say hope, I don't know if this will
happen or not but, that we see something that no one has
foreseen, I mean,…the nice thing about the bump at 750 GeV is
that, was that, there was no theory predicting …
Interviewer: Is this why you called the 750 GeV e it would have
been the discovery of the century, because it was not predicted at
all?
“Absolutely, yes. Yes, the Higgs boson could or could not have
been there but if it was there, we knew more or less where to
look at, I mean, we didn't know the mass but we had some
constraints from theory and it was clearly a missing part … It
would have taken a lot of time to really place [the 750 GeV] into
a frameworkwe understand. Andwhen nature surprises us with
phenomena that we don't understand it's always a good start
for, you know, a revolution of the mind rather than you know,
moving within the frame you know since years …”
In this extended quote, there are a number of things of which to
take note. We again see appeals to different notions of novelty:
where the Higgs was a novel experimental result, the 750 GeV
excess is cast as more novel in that it has not been predicted by the
SM or any other theory. This difference is again linked to expecta-
tions, where the path to find the Higgs is described as being simple
in that theoretical constraints drove expectations. Here we can see
the impact of expectations: the potential violation of expectationsstic appraisal of disruptive experimentation, Studies in History and
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ontology but also to wider knowledge frameworks, which include
established methods for the interpretation of results.
Gatz also articulated that there were negative expectations on
the 750 GeV excess in that events had only been observed in the
diphoton channel:
“So the weird thing is that it was not happening anywhere else
and there was on some sense what called for extreme caution
because we can say ‘okay, it's more likely to be a fluctuation or
something else’ and at the same time, extreme excitement
because if this proved to be a real then it's something we don't
understand and not understanding is always good, is always a
good starting point.”
The expectation for signals in other channels were based on a
number of generic predictions (not BSM model dependent),
assuming that the excess would be explained by a new resonance,
with mass of approximately 750 GeV, decaying into two photons
with either spin 0, 2 or higher (the possibility of a spin 1 resonance
was excluded because it cannot decay into gg (Landau, 1948; Yang,
1950)). Due to electroweak symmetry a resonance in the diphoton
channel indicates that excesses with the same invariant mass
should have been observed in other diboson channels (e.g. WW, ZZ)
(Strumia, 2016). Here Gatz paints the experimental expectations
that the 750 GeV result was unlikely as one of the reasons that the
750 GeV result was valued as a potential result. The value claimed
for the 750 GeV is that it would have required significant changes to
the ‘frame’, or the existing experimental and theoretical knowledge
structures, as opposed to the Higgs, which is described as being
easily accommodated. A potentially disruptive result is valued over
an expected result, a confirmation of theoretical prediction.
The value placed here on experimentally driven disruptive de-
velopments runs contrary to the numerous models from HPS,
which focus on the relationship between experiment and theory
confirmation. This one directional notion, where the role of theory
is to make predictions and the role of experiment is search for
evidence that, ideally, confirms the prediction, clearly does not
accommodate accounts of the different notions of novelty in the
750 GeV episode. It is certainly not unique to claim that the role of
experimentation needs further attention beyond theory confirma-
tion; the so-called ‘New Experimentalism’ literature that came out
of the experimentalist turn beginning in the 1980s foregrounded
the many roles of experiment as opposed to a one directional
relationship where theory directed the experimental agenda.18
A notable contribution to the New Experimentalism literature
includes the concept of an ‘exploratory experiment’ (Elliott, 2007;
Steinle, 1997, 2002) which sought to expand how the role of
experimentation could be understood beyond theory confirmation.
Elliot and Steinle showed historical examples of experiments that
were not ‘driven’ by theory. In Steinle's, 2002 paper, he outlines
exploratory experimentation as those experiments that do not aim
to be “tests of expectations” that instead are characterised by
having absence of specific guidelines. When considering the
concept of exploratory experimentation and disruption, a great
deal rests on the interpretation of a ‘test of expectations’. There is a
narrow sense of a test of expectations where a precise prediction
coming from theory forms the basis of an expectation. This sense
clearly does not capture disruptive results that are characterised as
violating expectations. However, if you consider a test of expecta-
tions more broadly, a test for expectations could be any experiment18 For classic texts, see (Cartwright, 1983; Franklin, 1986; Galison, 1987; Gooding,
Pinch, & Schaffer, 1989; Hacking, 1983).
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An important distinction needs to be made here in terms of how
I identify the concept of disruption in the interview content. There
are results that are interpreted as disruptive, such as the 750 GeV
excess, and there is broader notion of disruption embedded in the
experimental processes evaluated as having the potential to
generate unexpected or disruptive results. Examples of this are in
section 4.1 where Wilson outlines the potential of signature based
searches to generate results such as the 750 GeV excess and, as is
explored in section 4.2, the potential of precision measurements to
generate novel contradictory results. Whilst it is clear that the aim
of the experimental processes that aim for disruptive results is, at
least partially, not confirmation (in that these experiments allow
for both confirming and disruptive results), such experimental
processes cannot be characterised as having no theoretical goal in
mind in that the disruptive results would alter or destroy some of
the existing theoretical knowledge structures. Whilst these results
are not determined as confirmations of an existing theory, there is
still a relationship to theory: disruption.
This is a complementary understanding of experimentation to
exploratory experimentation (EE): disruptive exploratory experi-
mentation (DEE). In both cases, EE and DEE, theoretical confirma-
tion is not sought. In the case of exploratory experimentation,
according to Stienle and Elliott, it is due to lack of existing theory. In
the case of disruptive experimentation, it is due to an aim to deliver
a result that in some way contradicts the existing theory. However,
DEE is still exploratory in that a precise result is not specified or
aimed for but a more general result is aimed for, one that disrupts.
That is to say, disruptive experimentation, where successful, is
categorised as contradicting expectations generated by the existing
knowledge structures.
Karaca has also written about how ATLAS experiments do not fit
the category of EE due to the existence of existing well-formed
theory. He argues that it is still possible to consider the experi-
ment as being exploratory through a detailed account of the data
selection strategy in the trigger software (Karaca, 2017). Karaca
argues that a notion of exploratory procedures, as those that seek to
“extend the range of possible outcomes”, applies to the ATLAS
experiment (Karaca, 2017, p. 340). The account in this paper is
similar in that it highlights that it is not only confirmation that is
sought through the experimental practices. However, it differs in
that it highlights the positive appraisal of results, by some experi-
mentalists, that contradict and disrupt through the exploration of
how the 750 GeV result was valued and the appraisal of the po-
tential of measurements and signature based searches.
5.2. The heuristic appraisal of disruption
Inwhat follows, I will further expand on the positive appraisal of
disruption from the case study by showing that the appraisal is an
appraisal of future fertility, or heuristic appraisal in that disruption
is assessed as having the potential to provide alternative futures. As
far back as 1989, Thomas Nickles explored and attempted to argue
for the relevance of heuristic appraisal in reflections on scientific
practices and investigation. He argued that philosophy of science
had only focused on the retrospective assessments of scientists, and
had been slow to explore just how often scientists are forward
looking in their appraisals. Nickles argued that “novel predictions
do more than provide epistemic warrant for the tested theory: they
open up new areas of investigation” (Nickles, 1989). Nickles further
elaborated more recently, claiming that “[heuristic appraisal]
evaluates the promise or potential fertility or feasibility of further
work on a problem, research program, theory, hypothesis, model,
or technique. [Heuristic appraisal] estimates the likely return on instic appraisal of disruptive experimentation, Studies in History and
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or even in adding newmembers to a research team” (Nickles, 2006,
p. 159). Here I will examine heuristic appraisal in an experimental
context, to explore assessments of future fertility beyond novel
predictions.
It is important here to reflect on the local context of the 750 GeV
episode, and the timing of the interviews with the experimental-
ists. In the lead up to the first collisions at the LHC a number of
experimental and theoretical physicists discussed a possibility:
what if the predicted Higgs boson was found, and nothing else?
Some named this the ‘nightmare scenario’ because it would leave
experimentalists and theorists with a lack of direction as to future
results, or how to solve the problems of the SM. Theorist Aldo
Deandrea was quoted in Science in 2007 as saying: “If you have just
a Higgs that is consistent with the SM, then you probably don't
know what to do next …What then?” (Cho, 2007). At the time of
the interviews, a SM Higgs had been found, the 750 GeV excess was
a statistical fluke, and no other ‘novelties’ had been claimed. This
has led some theorists, such as the current head of theory at CERN,
Giudice (2017), to question whether there is currently a crisis in
high-energy particle physics. In the assessments of novelty made in
this context, disruption is evaluated as both a measure of difference
and as something that provides a direction. In the just discussed
example, Gatz strongly argues for the value of experimentally
driven disruptions in that they that have the potential to provide a
new direction, a “new starting point”.
I have alluded to the role of heuristic appraisal and forward-
looking aspects of appraisal in the previously discussed examples
of how different notions of novelty are framed (where I showed in
sections 4.1 and 4.2 that the interview participants frequently
focused on expectations and the promise of results). In the
following example, the role of heuristic appraisal is particularly
strongwhere the interview participant,Wolfsheim, reflected on the
theoretical attempts to explain the ATLAS signal19:
“…we had a broad signal and a broad signal to diphotons is very
hard to explain. It was a really ugly thing actually. So you needed
a lot of new physics to explain it, it would be actually fantastic if
it would have been true: we would have had a huge amount of
new physics. You know, because there's no way to explain it,
even just one additional resonance is … so you needed a loop
where you had particles in this loop to make it broad, to make it
a large cross section and so they were ingenious ideas in this
sense.”
The difficulty in explaining the signal originates from the
requirement that a large width is only possible if the potential
750 GeV resonance also decays to other final states than photons.
The width could have been caused by a new ‘hidden sector’ with
new particles that only very weakly couple to the SM (Strumia,
2016). Wolfsheim frames the ATLAS signal as novel in that there
was no readily apparent way to explain the result; the result is
different with respect to the established modes of interpretation of
result (i.e. the well-known BSM approaches20). This is also a further
example of how disruptive results are framed as positive.19 CMS indicated that their result favoured a narrow width (CMS, 2015).
20 The theoretical response to the 750 GeV resonance also demonstrates this point
from a different perspective. Many of the 500 þ theoretical papers published
attempted to incorporate the signal (with either a broad or narrow width) into
various BSM approaches, such as composite Higgs or dark matter models, however,
were not easily able to do so. See for example (Franceschini et al., 2015). Reflecting
on this in a summary talk theoretical physicist Strumia claimed that “the gg excess
is either the biggest statistical fluctuation since decades, or the main discovery”
(Strumia, 2016).
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or disruptive, result in that it would point researchers in the di-
rection of many future results that would be needed to accom-
modate the disruption. Nickles has called this aspect of heuristic
appraisal an “opportunity profile of a claim, technique, proposal
etc” (Nickles, 2006, p. 161). The expressions of the utility of
disruption, and its measure of novelty, can be understood as posi-
tive heuristic appraisal as disruption is assessed as providing future
directions.
Returning to the distinction highlighted between entities and
properties as different notions of novelty in section 4.2, and the
emphasis on the promise of the measurement of properties, it is
again worth reflecting on the context of the timing of the in-
terviews. The ATLAS and CMS experiments were entering into the
‘data driven’ phase, which they are currently in now, where the
focus has shifted to precision measurements as opposed to
searches. The appraisal that there is more ‘promise’ in precision
measurements than searches is also a heuristic appraisal in that it
has been appraised that there is the potential for future results that
might be disruptive coming from measurements, as opposed to
searches. This also helps explain the positive appraisal of “signa-
ture-based” searches over “model-based” searches, as identified by
Wilson in section 4.1, that there is value in these searches in that
theymake possible unexpected results that have the potential to be
disruptive.
Camilleri and Ritson have recently examined the role of heu-
ristic appraisal in theoretical high-energy physics through an
exploration of the role of heuristic appraisal in divergent assess-
ments of string theory. They found that heuristic appraisal of un-
solved and solved problems in theoretical approaches to quantum
gravity were considered in the context of the research program as a
whole (including the history) “rather than units that are constitu-
tive of progress” (Camilleri & Ritson, 2015). This insight can be
applied when attempting to explore disruption framed as a gauge
of novelty in the previously discussed context of a notion of crisis in
the high-energy physics programme, or a lack of direction from
past guiding principles. Disruption is valued, in part, in that it might
find a way to depart from the existing ontology and ways of
knowing. In that context this value is positive heuristic appraisal,
which is future focused as disruption provides different directions
and creates different potential futures. This picture of where future
progress is derived from is startlingly different from notions of
progress dependent on the successful confirmation of theoretical
predictions. It is instead a notion of progress based on hoped for
contradictions to the existing theoretical and experimental struc-
tures, in the expectation that a contradictory result (the more
disruptive the better) will have to be retrospectively explained and
will require some level of destruction to existing theoretical
structures. These expectations are formed from heuristic appraisals
of disruption as offering alternative fertile futures.
Whilst the notion of futures driven from experimental disrup-
tion does contradict various models of scientific progress from HPS
based on an epistemic value to confirmation, it is important to be
careful with claims of uniqueness of the current period as a his-
torically unique period in the history of particle physics. Such
claims depend on at least a somewhat static understanding, or
single direction, of progress historically, and this understanding
does not reflect the diversity of theoretical and experimental
practices explored in STS and HPS literature, especially following
the insights from the experimentalist turn and the insights of
Steinle into the history of physics (1997, 2002). Similarly, it is
important to be careful with claims of a crisis in high-energy par-
ticle physics. This notion, whilst it may come from a broadly Kuh-
nian perspective, is, as it stands, an actor's category employed in
various ways by certain physicists. A more precise understanding ofstic appraisal of disruptive experimentation, Studies in History and
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before there can be further development on these questions. As was
outlined in the opening quotation, and emphasised throughout this
paper, a notion of something being sufficiently different from the
past as to command attention is difficult to articulate.
6. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to explore how novelty is framed by
the experimentalist interview participants that were involved in
the 750 GeV episode, and to disambiguate between various uses of
the concept. The aim was not to develop a comprehensive taxon-
omy of novelty, but instead to understand different aspects of the
concept of novelty in the context of the 750 GeV episode and in the
context of current epistemic environment of particle physics. The
approach that was taken, to identify novelty, was to consider
novelty as a valued difference. This approach was born out of
consideration of lessons from the formal and detailed approaches
in HPS literature to offer a conceptually driven analysis of the
interviewmaterials. The advantage of this approach was that it was
not as broad as approaching novelty as only ‘newness’, but still
allowed for the exploration of diverse results. Of course, this
approach suffers from the same difficulties in that valued differ-
ences are also a broad category, but this approach also fore-
grounded the role of appraisal in how novelty is framed through
the exploration of the attribution of value. The approach resulted in
a relational approach to novelty, in that through the exploration of
relations, invoked by interview participants, various expressions of
novelty were analysed.
This relational approach revealed different reference classes of
relations in which novelty can be identified. Property novelty and
entity novelty were identified and distinguished in different de-
scriptions by interview participants of the modes of research and
epistemic practices in the context of the current phase of high-
energy particle physics. The potential for novelty in measure-
ments of properties was emphasised over searches. Furthermore,
differing scales of difference, and therefore novelty, were identified
through the exploration of the role of theoretical expectations.
Where the less a result was expected, the more novel the result was
conceived to be. That is to say, the more different and (positively)
valued the result was conceived to be.
Understanding how results that differed from expectations
could be construed as more novel came from a further exploration
of the positive heuristic appraisal of results that require changes to
the existing structures. This was developed from the observation
that the positive appraisals are future focused and by drawing upon
Nickles' notion of heuristic appraisal, modified for a perspective
from experiment. On this modified account, heuristic appraisals of
experiments or results are based on assessments of future fertility
such as the likelihood of generating progress, or of opening up new
areas for inquiry. This paper argues that it is disruption rather than
theoretical confirmation that is most valued, in that it is judged as
being able potentially to provide alternate future directions in a
phase characterised as lacking direction from traditional con-
straints. This paper also introduced a notion of disruptive explor-
atory experimentation, which aims for disruptive novelty, as a
complementary category of experimentation to exploratory
experimentation (Elliott, 2007; Steinle, 1997, 2002).
The approach taken in the paper is to consider novelty as a
valued difference, an approach which also permits consideration of
differences which have negative value. The perspective coming
from the experimentalists interviewed for the paper is one of a
positive value for differences, even epistemic disruption, needs to
be understood in the context from which the claims were made.
This paper, however, stops short of following some of the physicistsPlease cite this article as: Ritson, S., Probing novelty at the LHC: Heuri
Philosophy of Modern Physics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2019.08.00in their portrayal of high-energy particle physics as experiencing a
crisis or of labelling some of the current thinking and modes of
appraisal of experimentalists guided by the positive heuristic
appraisal of disruption as unique. It is unlikely that nothing similar
to this can be found in the history of high-energy particle physics,
as that would rest on assumption of an unchanging mode of
experimental particle physics research. Whilst it is important to be
careful of in how far we consider the current phase as ‘exceptional’,
as that assumes a view that is not historically well informed, it is
also important to reflect on some of the interesting aspects that this
case study highlights. Disruption is very often considered pejora-
tively, so expressions of positive appraisals of the utility of
disruption contribute to understandings of scientific appraisal,
especially those based on heuristic appraisal. This exploration of
the role of disruption also contributes to a more nuanced view of
the iterative relationship between theory and experiment in high-
energy physics.
Some questions that remain open include to what extent are
there disagreements within the experimental collaborations in
appraisals of novelty or the future fertility of novel ways of
knowing. It is also not clear precisely how heuristic appraisal can
play a role in the positive appraisal of novel ways of knowing.
Clearly, facilitating potential novel results in the future forms part
of the assessment, but how such assessments are made, and how
disagreements resolved, for yet to be completed experiments (both
within the LHC experiments and more broadly, such as in consid-
erations of future generations of particle accelerators) remains to
be seen. Finally, theoretical perspectives on disruption are unclear
from this account, the timing and number of publications on the
initial excess suggest a certain attribution of value for some, how-
ever the controversy surrounding these publications (Garisto, 2016)
also suggests a complex picture.Acknowledgements
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